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My friend and former colleague Omri Ben-Shahar has established
a reputation for providing nuanced and well-grounded applications of
economic analysis to important problems of contract law. In recent
years, he has undertaken the ambitious task of exploring a significant
topic at the boundary of contract law: liability for problems that arise
out of efforts to form a contract. The essay to which I reply, Contracts
1
Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, is his
second work on that topic, following his 2001 article with Lucian
2
Bebchuk entitled Precontractual Reliance. Collectively, these pieces provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between opportunistic behavior and contract law.
My goal in this reply is not to challenge that analysis directly, but
rather, to test its boundaries. As a thematic matter, I discuss the practical domain in which the proposed new basis for contractual liability
is useful and examine the plausibility of the doctrinal solutions that
Ben-Shahar recommends. I first address the propriety of using a single regime to resolve preconsensual and postconsensual problems. I
then consider whether the characterization of Ben-Shahar’s proposal
as a default rule responds to the concerns that I raise in the first part
of my discussion.
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I. TWO REGIMES
The most elegant aspect of Ben-Shahar’s essay is its use of a single
model to resolve problems arising along a continuum, starting at the
point when parties begin to consider a transaction and running
3
through to the period after they have come to a formal agreement.
Although that unified model is provocative, I do not think Ben-Shahar
has made a case for it. On the contrary, however passé it might seem
to provide a defense of a long-standing doctrinal framework, I argue
that the existing framework reflects real and important functional distinctions that Ben-Shahar’s proposed framework cannot readily accommodate.
The proposed regime rests on a considered rejection of the significance of any specific moment at which negotiating parties intentionally and consciously agree to be bound by a contract. Thus, in this
4
regime, the date of the closing ritual is of no special importance.
Specifically, this regime would discard aspects of the existing framework that provide a discontinuous shift from one liability regime before that moment of closing (principally tort-based liability for bad
5
faith negotiation) to a different liability regime after that moment
6
(expectation damages for breach of contract). In their place, a noretraction regime would substitute a gradual and continuous increase
7
of liability throughout the preconsensual period, culminating in full
8
expectation damages at the point of the contract.
Before beginning an affirmative critique, it seems important to
note a threshold ambiguity in the difference between the proposed
regime and the existing law. The existing law already permits the
3

See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1833 (describing his theory as a “unifying principle”).
4
See id. at 1834-35 (applying the no-retraction regime to preliminary agreements).
5
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1743, 1811-13 (2000) (discussing cases in which a party’s conduct prompted the
court to impose a duty to negotiate in good faith, even when no such commitment
arose through agreement); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 273-85 (1987)
(listing several courses of conduct that courts have held to be “unfair dealing” in precontractual negotiations, such as “improper tactics” and “non-disclosure”).
6
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (outlining the default
measure of damages under the current common law).
7
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1838 (describing the spectrum of liability throughout the negotiations process).
8
See id. at 1859 (“When the precontractual understanding is comprehensive and
needs no supplementation, the option to enforce it converges with standard contractual liability.”).
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recovery of reliance damages in circumstances that do not involve a
bargain, specifically, where the party that seeks to recover reliance
damages can show that it acted reasonably in expending money based
9
on the actions of the other party. Thus, if a financing partner tells a
developer that it should proceed to break ground on a building on
the assumption that the parties will be able to work out the details of a
financing arrangement, the developer has a good case for reliance
damages against the financer, even in the absence of a contract that
10
would permit expectation damages.
Although the no-retraction regime is plainly different, the extent
of the difference is not entirely clear. If Ben-Shahar contends that
parties should be liable for expenditures made by potential contract
partners only after they make serious proposals, he is saying something not substantially different from what already exists in the current law. The current law would permit such damages if, considering
the circumstances, the expending party reasonably could treat the
proposal as a license to spend money. That legal remedy usually arises
where one party (based on conduct of the other) justifiably relies on
11
the fact that a contract is forthcoming. Ben-Shahar’s proposal provides a remedy at an earlier stage (before the parties reach a point
when it is fair to assume that a contract is forthcoming). Ben-Shahar’s
discussion, however, says little about how to determine which communications create liability. His model takes as a given that “serious”
communications will induce an appropriate measure of reliance and
12
that all other communications will be ignored. That model, however, simply assumes away the problem—which largely occupies the
existing doctrine—of determining what types of promises are suffi13
ciently serious to warrant reliance on the part of the recipient.
However, that narrower understanding of Ben-Shahar’s proposal
is inconsistent with his emphasis on a slow and gradual development
9

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (setting forth the doctrine of promissory estoppel).
10
See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1305-09 (1980) (discussing several cases in which
courts used promissory estoppel to enforce “relied-upon nonreciprocal promises”).
11
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (noting that courts can
remedy injustice resulting from reasonable reliance on a promise).
12
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1843 (defining “serious” communications and
positing that liability for retraction ought to be limited to such communications).
13
This problem is the general topic of Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996). Craswell notes that liability often “turn[s]
on whether the party . . . attempting to withdraw said anything the law will interpret as
a ‘promise’ on which the other party ‘reasonably’ relied.” Id. at 482-83.
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of liability based on the gradual juxtaposition of negotiating posi14
tions. Reliance damages, as typically contemplated, have the same
type of all-or-nothing switch that expectation damages under consentbased liability rules do. Thus, although a party can recover nothing
expended before it is reasonable for that party to rely, it can recover
15
everything that is reasonably expended after it is reasonable to rely.
Ben-Shahar’s proposal, in contrast, seems to contemplate a sort of
quasi-expectation liability regime, in which each party is always liable
for the expectation of the other party for those points on which the
first party has offered a position. As the comprehensiveness of the position increases, the potential liability increases. As the juxtaposition
increases, the real-world likelihood that the proposal would be enforced increases.
That precisely reticulated increase in liability is substantially different from the current law. I do not think, however, that it works out
in practice quite as simply as Ben-Shahar’s presentation suggests. It is
not clear, for example, how he would match a slow increase in the
number of agreed-upon issues to a slow increase in monetary liability.
He assumes that a court practicably could enforce a gradual increase
in liability at any stage through a combination of (a) the then-agreedupon terms and (b) the least favorable terms on all other subjects. As
the ratio of agreed-upon terms to least favorable terms increased
through the course of negotiations, the recoverable amount would increase. Whether such a complicated proposition can be implemented
by courts is a threshold question about the proposal.
Putting those threshold questions aside, the principal purpose of
my response is to consider the propriety of Ben-Shahar’s unified
framework. Ultimately, my response to the proposal is the standard
move one would expect from a scholar of a particularizing tendency
like myself: This framework fails to pay due regard to the considerations that affect parties on either side of the traditional line at which
the parties agree to be bound.

14

See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1831 (“Thus, in effect, the greater the ‘fraction’
of a contract the parties have, the greater the ‘fraction’ of contract liability the plaintiff
can enforce.”).
15
See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 224-25 (discussing this timing problem in calculating reliance damages).
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A. Before Consent
The central contribution of Ben-Shahar’s project is its treatment
of the period before consent. Because the project focuses on opportunism, he uses a model in which negotiation is a process of dividing
16
the surplus that the contract would create. Within that model, any
retreat from a negotiating position plausibly is viewed as an opportunistic effort to capture an inappropriate share of the surplus. To enable those negotiating positions to generate more credibility, and thus
17
more effectiveness at inducing reliance, the proposed regime would
18
impose liability on those who “retract” serious negotiating proposals.
That conclusion rests on his analysis (here and in his work with
19
Bebchuk) of the benefits that will arise from enhancing the ability of
the promisee to adapt her behavior in response to a credible promise.
The obvious question is whether such an analysis gives due weight
to the costs of promising that inevitably arise when promises are made
20
subject to greater legal sanction. Ben-Shahar, of course, recognizes
this possibility. Indeed, Ben-Shahar notes that his proposal will
21
“weaken[]” parties’ “‘freedom from contract.’” He argues that this
weakening is not a significant problem because “parties that place
great value on this freedom can choose to opt out of the liability con22
sequences and opt into the consensus regime.” I have three general
responses to that line of reasoning: (1) Ben-Shahar overestimates the
importance of opportunism in the preconsensual period and understates the importance of risk assessment; (2) Ben-Shahar underestimates the adverse effects of enforcing nonreciprocal promises; and
(3) in practice, parties can make their negotiating commitments
credible without this regime.

16

The model is set out formally in Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 430.
This form of analysis builds implicitly on Goetz & Scott, supra note 10.
18
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1838 (describing the theoretical operation of
no-retraction principles during negotiations).
19
Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 446-47, 456-57; Ben-Shahar, supra note
1, at 1847-53.
20
Here I, too, draw on the framework articulated in Goetz & Scott, supra note 10,
at 1265-88. My specific concern is with the costs of promising that Charles Goetz &
Robert Scott discuss. See id. at 1271-74 (evaluating how prospective sanctions modify
the behavior of promisors, including a description of the “regret contingency” and certain precautionary costs). For a recent elaboration of these ideas, see Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 559-62
(2003).
21
Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1842 (emphasis omitted).
22
Id.
17
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1. How Important Is Opportunism?
I was asked to contribute a Commentary with both empirical and
doctrinal emphases as a counterpart to the philosophical and analytical emphases to be expected from the other commentators. It is, of
course, not practical to conduct any substantial empirical investigation
of the relevant questions in the brief space of this Commentary. Still,
some useful empirical intuitions may shed light on the matter.
Ben-Shahar’s analysis focuses on opportunism. The benefits of that
approach, as I mentioned above, are significant. It gives us a keen
understanding of the effects of existing and possible legal regimes on
the potential for opportunistic behavior in preconsensual negotiations. The difficulty is in moving from that laboratory-like understanding of opportunism to a richer world of contracting in which
opportunism is not the only—or even the dominant—factor that affects negotiations.
At its heart, Ben-Shahar’s work implicitly seems to use as its paradigm a contract for the sale of simple assets (such as commodities), in
which price and timing are the main issues and in which little information about the specific asset need be assembled. In that context,
opportunism may be an important problem in negotiations. On the
other hand, such a case rarely produces the kinds of complex and
protracted negotiations that should be the focal point of rules for negotiation misconduct.
My background, in contrast, leads me to wonder how this analysis
would apply in contracts involving complex assets such as going concerns or commercial real estate, transactions in which a host of informational issues dominates each negotiation. Neither perspective is
complete. My point, however, is that the search for a unified framework can succeed only if that framework addresses both the commodities context (on which I consider Ben-Shahar to focus) and other,
more information-laden contexts.
The core of Ben-Shahar’s analysis is a no-retraction principle,
which he states as follows:
A party who manifests a willingness to enter into a contract at given
terms should not be able to freely retract from her manifestation. The
opposing party, even if he did not manifest assent, and unless he rejected the terms, acquires an option to bind his counterpart to her rep23
resentation or charge her with some liability in case she retracts.

23

Id. at 1830 (emphases omitted).
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The inconsistency of this proposal with current commercial practice in some settings is striking. To take one anecdotal and relatively
simple example, imagine a party that wishes to purchase an industrial
tool and sends several “request for quote” inquiries to prominent sup24
pliers. Absent some special term in the “request for quote” inquiry,
the party looking for the tool could be held liable for the expenditures made in responding to the inquiry by each of the suppliers—or
possibly even for expectation damages, computed using a price term
25
favorable to the purchaser. Essentially, the regime starts from the
assumption that an invitation to begin negotiations is ordinarily binding because a decision to retreat from such an invitation is necessarily
opportunistic. It is easy to conclude that application of this rule in
such a situation would substantially chill the ability of parties to enter
such negotiations without first opting out of the applicable default le26
gal regime. It is also easy to see, as Ben-Shahar acknowledges quite

24

A similar example could arise in numerous contexts: general contractors negotiating with subcontractors, sports teams negotiating with multiple players for the same
position, etc.
25
Ben-Shahar addresses the multiple-party problem explicitly, suggesting that all
will be well as long as it is made clear that the proposal is being sent to multiple parties
or the parties otherwise opt out of his regime. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1868
(“[T]he original proposal to the multiple parties can be understood to include an implicit condition that no more than one of the responses can lead to a deal.”). As discussed below, I do not think it is an entirely adequate response to say that people can
opt out of his regime, particularly in a setting in which the parties have not yet contracted. See infra Part II (identifying “[p]roblems with [o]pting [o]ut”).
26
Ben-Shahar argues that his proposal will not chill negotiations for two general
reasons. He argues broadly that both parties will benefit from the enhanced accuracy
of preconsensual investments that his proposal will bring. See Ben-Shahar, supra note
1, at 1852 (“[T]he no-retraction regime can be viewed as a commitment device. When
parties negotiate a deal, their lack of commitment . . . chills the incentives of their negotiating partners to make reliance investments.”). More specifically, he argues that
his proposal provides reciprocal benefits by allowing each party to be sure that the
other party will not retract. See id. at 1847 (claiming that “the no-retraction regime
proves superior in settings in which the social goal is to encourage precontractual reliance”). As my example (and most of the other examples in this critique) suggests,
there often will not be a reciprocal likelihood of retraction. Moreover, even in cases of
reciprocal negotiation, it is not at all plain to me that parties would prefer his proposal,
given the moral hazard and uncertainty to which it subjects them. Rather, sophisticated parties in such a case may prefer to liquidate their liability for a specific sum, a
practice that I discuss below. See, e.g., Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 45 (Del.
1997) (approving a $550 million reciprocal termination fee in a merger agreement
between telecommunications firms). Thus, although a no-retraction rule might be
useful in some cases, it might deter negotiations in cases for which Ben-Shahar’s assumptions hold untrue, especially nonreciprocal cases. To assess the significance of
that problem, of course, requires a better understanding of the contexts in which reciprocal negotiations might occur.
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27

openly, that his framework might substantially increase the transaction and litigation costs associated with such a “request for quote” in28
quiry.
But it is not particularly useful to focus solely on specific settings
in which the proposal is inconsistent with current practice. Rather,
my goal is to generalize about the proper domain of Ben-Shahar’s
proposal. On that point, I discern three broad limitations on the application of a no-retraction rule: (1) the limited value of this proposal
for relational contracts; (2) the limited domain of contracts in which
preconsensual surplus is important; and most significantly, (3) the
importance of information in preconsensual negotiation.
First, the problem of opportunism can have dispositive weight
only in discrete contracts. As the literature on relational contracting
suggests, the parties to contracts that involve ongoing relationships
have many privately designed mechanisms for dealing with opportun29
ism. The efficacy of those mechanisms is likely to be undermined,
not bolstered, by the addition of legal liability to nonreciprocal nego30
tiating statements. That harm is particularly likely to occur when the

27

See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1847 (“[I]t might well be that a mutual assent
regime with majoritarian defaults is cheaper to administer than a no-retraction regime
with pro -defendant gap-fillers.”).
28
By subjecting parties to substantial liability from the moment that they begin
negotiations, Ben-Shahar’s proposal increases the importance of careful legal advice
and of a precise understanding of the relevant legal rules from the earliest moment of
negotiations. In its current form, the proposal is vague as to precisely what types of
statements will establish a duty to go forward and at what time any such statements
must be honored before the proposer can retract without fear of liability. See id. at
1843 (explaining why liability for precontractual reliance attaches only “to proposals
that are sufficiently rich in detail”). Even if those issues could be clarified, this rule still
would produce considerable complexity in cases involving parallel negotiations on
multiple possible structures for a transaction (parallel discussions of asset and stock
purchases, for example).
29
See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1788 (1996) (explaining why “rational transactors might deliberately leave aspects of their contracting relationship to
be governed, in whole or in part, by extralegal commitments and sanctions”); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV.
55, 63 (1963) (“[C]ontract and contract law are often thought unnecessary because
there are many effective non-legal sanctions.”); Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions
in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2226 (1999) (describing how commercial
parties use nonlegal mechanisms such as reputation to resolve information asymmetries).
30
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1281 (“[I]n contexts in which self-sanctions
are already effective and the prospects of improved information are poor, the social
gains from enforcement are negligible and may be exceeded by implementation
costs.”); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L.
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parties have arranged their affairs in reliance on a particular set of
self-enforcing rules that are different from the contract rules that
31
might be available in a judicial forum, as often will be the case. It is
difficult to know, of course, what share of contracts is discrete, rather
than relational. It is plain, in any event, that the number of contracts
involving discrete negotiations is sufficiently substantial to warrant
separate legal treatment. The problem with a unified theory, then, is
that the theory’s overarching framework imposes costs on any subset
of cases for which it is not optimal. The entire class of relational contracting may fall into that category.
Ben-Shahar’s analysis also rests on the assumption that preconsensual investments are crucial in many settings. That assumes, in turn,
that surplus often can be created only—or, perhaps, most optimally—
by preconsensual, rather than postconsensual, investments. Again,
this framework has obvious application in many cases. The case of a
contractor relying on an unaccepted bid of a subcontractor in the
32
contractor’s own bid is a common one. The ability of the parties
jointly to profit from a successful bid by the contractor is enhanced
considerably by the ability of the contractor to treat the subcontrac33
tor’s bid as credible. On the other hand, preconsensual investments
seem unnecessary in many cases. For instance, in Ben-Shahar’s em34
ployee-relocation example, the preconsensual investment frequently
would be suboptimal. How often does it create substantial value for
an employee to quit an old job before finding a new job? At bottom,

REV. 1641, 1693 (2003) (concluding that the enforcement of agreements that parties
intentionally left indefinite would be “counterproductive,” even when the hoped-for
reciprocity fails).
31
See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 1789 (suggesting that in some markets “nonlegal sanctions such as reputation bonds are strong enough, . . . making a legally enforceable provision unnecessary”); Scott, supra note 30, at 1657 (noting that parties
often appear to prefer “the indefinite agreement” to the more complete, “explicit[,]
and verifiable alternative that they ignored”).
32
See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958) (finding that
a mistake in a subcontractor bid proposal did not prevent the court from awarding
damages to the contractor who relied on that proposal).
33
For an interesting variation on that situation, see Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v.
Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 805 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the duty of good faith under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code prevents an open-price supplier from
raising its price after its customer has submitted bids, even if the supplier was not
aware of the specific bids).
34
See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 423 (“[I]n negotiating an employment contract, the employee may quit other jobs, acquire knowledge about the new
task, or turn down competing offers, while the employer may prepare tasks and facilities for the potential employee.” (footnote omitted)).
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an empirical question exists with regard to the size and frequency of
valuable preconsensual investments. That question surely must be influenced by the prevalence of contractual models that permit postcontract creation of surplus through the use of open terms in cases in
which one party must invest before the other if the payoff is to be
36
maximized.35 Ben-Shahar’s formal model assumes that the need for
large preconsensual investments is commonplace. If, however, that
need is not so commonplace, then the benefits that his model provides—by limiting the adverse effects of opportunism on those investments—will not be large enough to offset the countervailing costs
37
of holding the promisor so liable.
Third, Ben-Shahar assumes that the parties have perfect informa38
tion. That assumption is not, of course, unusual, and it does allow
him to sharpen the analysis of the effects opportunism will have on
the willingness of potential contract partners to rely on the likely success of negotiations. On the other hand, it has the debilitating effect
of excluding from his paradigm much of what is important in the reality of contract negotiation. Imagine a paradigm in which negotiation
is not a process of dividing the surplus, but a collection of information
39
and allocation of risk. In that paradigm, the parties are constantly
exchanging, acquiring, and assessing information about the transaction

35

See Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997,
997-98 (1992) (discussing such contracts generally).
36
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1849 nn.39-40, 1851 n.45 (describing the relevant equations).
37
Moreover, in assessing the benefits of his model, it is not clear that we should
include cases in which precontractual surpluses are important if the existing law seems
to provide adequate mechanisms for inducing appropriate investments. Because the
courts normally provide for a recovery in the most prominent example that he offers
(the subcontractor bid case discussed above) in which it is important that the surplus
be precontractual, the size of the domain that benefits from his proposal is not apparent.
38
Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 430. For an earlier effort to model the
implications of imperfect information in this context, see Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1989).
39
That perspective is common in the economic analysis of preconsensual negotiation, including the following articles, two of the many influential works on this subject:
Goetz & Scott, supra note 10 (examining the function of promises and the impact of
liability on the making of promises in a world of imperfect information and costly legal
processes); Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics
and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385 (1999) (analyzing the economic
incentives that underlie the dealmaking process, with a focus on exploring how they
vary under alternative institutional and market structures and how legal liability may
shape them).
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in question, decreasing the areas of risk as they increase the areas of
knowledge.
For a transaction of that type, it would be perfectly customary to
40
41
retreat from a previous negotiating position. For example, consider
parties negotiating over the acquisition of a large, real estate project.
On day ten of negotiations, based on the information available, the
purchaser might be willing to suggest an $80 million price, reflecting
an expected or “typical” allowance for environmental risks that have
not yet been evaluated. On day eleven, after the purchaser receives an
environmental report showing many unexpected difficulties, the purchaser’s proposed price might fall to $70 million, for reasons that the
seller would regard as entirely legitimate. The acquisition of information that allowed both parties more accurately to estimate the likely
value of the asset going forward should have established for both parties that the field of negotiation should shift to reflect the new information. Similarly, information received a few days later indicating
that a major tenant had decided to renew its lease might cause the
purchaser’s price to return to the $80 million range.
More generally, this paradigm views each party’s negotiating position at any given time as reflecting its then-current estimate of the asset’s value, using predictions regarding the likely resolution of large
numbers of contingencies—predictions that depend on information
available to the parties at that time. As time goes on, more and more
information is collected, steadily decreasing—though, of course,
never eliminating—uncertainty about the future income flows the asset might generate. The continuing resolution of uncertainty has two
effects on the development of the transaction. First, by reducing the
expected variance of outcomes, it diminishes the importance that the
parties’ levels of risk aversion might have on their ability to reach an
agreement. Second, by removing specific items of risk that the parties
must allocate for the transaction to result in a consensual arrangement, the continuing production of information decreases the complexity of the contract that is necessary to reflect such an arrangement.
40

See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 280-81 (discussing “[r]eneging” in contract negotiations).
41
My examples of necessity reflect the simplifying assumption that negotiations
proceed along a single continuum that can be characterized usefully by a single numerical “price.” The reality, of course, is that even simple negotiations are likely to
involve many issues that cannot easily be collapsed into a single dimension that resembles a monetary equivalent. That reality—absent from my examples—is a large part of
what makes it difficult to suppose that retraction ordinarily is improper.
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To be sure, nothing in Ben-Shahar’s surplus-division paradigm is
formally inconsistent with this information/risk paradigm. There is
no logical reason why parties that have not yet collected all of the information relevant to the success of a project could not be bound by
their negotiating positions. Moreover, the proposed regime includes
a safety valve specifically designed to accommodate changes of position that are not opportunistic. Ben-Shahar (along with Bebchuk)
explains that a retraction is not opportunistic if made “after it has become clear that the profitability of the intended trade is so low that
42
trade is not desirable.” It is difficult, however, to know precisely what
that statement means. Circumstances can change in many ways that
might affect the desirability of a transaction, ranging from the receipt
of information about the quality of the particular asset, to the receipt
of information about markets that might affect the value of the asset
indirectly (such as the business plans of parties that might rent or
otherwise use the asset in the future), to the receipt of information
about the value of the asset directly (such as competing offers to pur43
chase the asset). Ben-Shahar offers no baseline for deciding what
type of trade is considered “desirable.” Desirable for whom? Is it
desirable to sell an asset at a price lower than the price at which it
originally was purchased? Does it matter how long the asset has been
on the market? Does it matter how long the parties have been nego44
tiating without coming to an agreement? Without a baseline, it is
difficult—perhaps impossible—for parties to understand what types
of retractions would be opportunistic. From that point, it should go
without saying that judges are not likely to resolve those questions cos45
tlessly and without error. As Bob Scott recently explained, the likelihood
42

Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 447.
Mark Gergen, for example, explains Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d
267 (Wis. 1965), in this way. See Mark P. Gergen, Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1990) (presenting this particular analysis of Hoffman).
44
As Daniel Markovits points out, a duty not to terminate negotiations is a striking
departure from commercial practice that is likely to include very little conduct that
parties would find improper and a great deal of conduct that parties would view as unquestionably legitimate. See Daniel Markovits, The No-Retraction Principle and the Morality of Negotiations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1903, 1920 (2004) (“It may happen, for example,
that the slow pace of convergence causes one party to conclude that the final deal will
not be worth its transaction costs and therefore to withdraw its last offer and abandon
the negotiation altogether.”). A perfectly rational view that the transaction costs of
concluding an agreement are likely to exceed the potential profits from any eventual
agreement is entirely legitimate but at the same time quite difficult to verify in court.
45
See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 448 (recognizing that courts must
“be able to verify claims of changed circumstances and to distinguish between realizations that were or were not expected by the parties”).
43
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of inefficiency and moral hazard makes it particularly problematic to
adopt a default rule, such as the one I examine here, that relies on in46
formation “unverifiable” by courts.
More fundamentally, the question of whether trade is “desirable”
does not seem to define “opportunism” in a useful way. Ben-Shahar
suggests that the opportunism with which he is concerned involves an
effort by one party to take advantage of another party’s existing in47
vestments by making offers that “hold up” the invested party. But
whether the test for “desirable” trade will perfectly match transactions
that do not involve the “holdup” problem on which he focuses remains uncertain. As discussed above, parties acting within the information/risk paradigm often will have legitimate reasons for backtracking that have nothing to do with the holdup problem—reasons that a
rational negotiating partner would perceive as legitimate and that
seem impossible to evaluate under Ben-Shahar’s “desirable trade”
standard. Importantly, it is not at all clear that such reasons would be
apparent to the contracting partner or verifiable by a court without
significant cost to the parties. Thus, it would be difficult for the parties to write a contractual provision that specified the holdup problem
in a way that reliably would produce “correct” results under judicial
48
scrutiny. Moreover, as Ben-Shahar himself explains in his work with
49
Lisa Bernstein, information about a party’s valuation of a specific
contracting opportunity often will constitute proprietary information
that cannot be revealed costlessly either to a negotiating partner or to
a judicial forum assessing the propriety of the retracting party’s ac50
tions. A regime that starts from the presumption that backtracking
and retraction are opportunistic is unlikely to provide a sensitive resolution of disputes that arise out of this type of interaction.

46

See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 87-91 (2003)
(noting that a party’s private valuation rarely is verifiable by a court and discussing the
problems with default rules that rely on such information).
47
See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 426 (discussing opportunistic offers
as those “that leave the other party with a net negative payoff ”).
48
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1296 (discussing likely error costs of judicial
enforcement in this area); Scott, supra note 46, at 87-90 (portraying the unverifiability
of information like a party’s valuation of the contract as a barrier to the efficient formation of contracts); Scott, supra note 30, at 1687 (analyzing the role of indefiniteness
in the resolution of contract suits).
49
Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 1885 (2000).
50
See id. at 1886-88 (arguing that parties often desire to keep private the information used to value lost profits and that this “secrecy interest” may outweigh a party’s
compensatory interest).
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A second reason that negotiating partners whose interactions are
best described by the information/risk paradigm might not wish to
have their negotiating positions held binding is to preserve the ability
to opt out of negotiations entirely. The heart of the information/risk
paradigm is a continuing collection of information, which steadily decreases uncertainty and risk, so that the expected variance in outcomes of the asset decreases in the estimation of both parties. Parties
with standardized investment regimes as a matter of policy would not
be willing to enter into a final transaction unless the uncertainty and
variance could be reduced to a level appropriate for their business
models.
Consider, for example, a lender investigating potential loan transactions. For rational reasons, the lender might prefer to specialize in
51
making loans that involve a particular level of risk. Such a lender,
through the course of the transaction, might provide relatively detailed predictions of the likely terms on which it would enter into a final transaction. As evidence is collected about any particular transaction, the potential terms might shift back and forth. But the lender
would have no intention of entering into a final transaction, on any
terms, unless sufficient information could be obtained to lower the uncertainty and expected variance of the transaction to the level typical
of the lender’s portfolio. To be sure, those parties could opt out of
this regime and avoid the undue costs it might impose on their promises. As discussed below, however, that solution seems to deprive the
52
parties of gains available under the existing regime.

51

Among the most obvious reasons for such specialization are (1) that the lender
might be able to price the risk of such transactions more accurately through experience with a portfolio of transactions involving homogenous risk and (2) that the
lender might specialize in the management of assets involving a particular level of risk
through the employment of lending officers and loan servicing employees with skills
appropriate for assessing that particular level of risk.
52
See infra Part II (addressing three major problems inherent to Ben-Shahar’s
suggested system). One minor point to mention here relates to the division of responsibility in large firms. For many firms, relatively low-level representatives, who would
not in the view of the firm have authority to bind the firm in any way, will negotiate
important business issues on behalf of that firm. Such a firm agrees to be bound at an
appropriate step in the process, through action by individuals formally authorized to
obligate the firm. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 219 (describing the corporate
negotiating process). A regime that starts from the assumption that opportunism is
the cause of the unwillingness of senior executives to agree to a transaction approved
by lower executives does not comport with this arrangement.
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None of the foregoing is intended to suggest that no parties negotiate a transaction from equal perspectives of substantially complete
information. Nor is it intended to suggest that parties do not shift
during the course of their negotiations—even before a formal moment of consent—to a regime in which they expect to be bound by
their ongoing representations. However, the limited range within
which negotiations of that type occur makes problematic the application to all negotiations of a default rule predicated on opportunism as
the central problem.
2. The Problem of Excessive Reliance
Parallel to the empirical concerns discussed above is an analytical
concern that the award of reliance damages in the preconsensual setting will create excessive reliance. Because the basic point is a simple
53
one, made decades ago by Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, it does
not warrant extended discussion. Essentially, the concern is that a
54
rule allowing a party to recover its reliance costs creates a moral hazard because that party no longer has an optimal incentive to limit the
55
expenditures that it makes in reliance on the promise in question.

53

Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1285.
There seems to me some confusion between Ben-Shahar’s concept of reliance
expenditures and the remedy for reliance damages. The first concept, “reliance expenditures,” is a term Ben-Shahar uses here (and in his work with Bebchuk) to include
all contract-related expenditures. See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 423
(describing reliance expenditures as “investments that will raise the value of performance if the contract is formed but will have a lesser value otherwise”); Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1848 n.37 (employing the term for a similar meaning). Ben-Shahar’s
model analyzes a rule that provides for recovery of those expenditures, which he characterizes generally as a rule providing for reliance damages. Id. at 1845, 1871. Because
Ben-Shahar ties his work directly to the tradition (which he dates to L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2), 46 YALE L.J. 373
(1937)) analyzing the relative merits of expectation and reliance damages, BenShahar, supra note 1, at 1831 & n.1, he plainly contemplates his proposal as an extension of reliance damages to the precontractual period. The problem, however, is that
there is a distinction between reliance damages, which typically would include only the
expenditures made in reliance on the offer, and Ben-Shahar’s reliance expenditures,
which would include the larger category of project-related costs. Goetz and Scott recognize this issue and use the term “reimbursement damages” to describe what courts
actually award, as opposed to a theoretically optimal recovery of “reliance damages.”
Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1288. I assume here that Ben-Shahar intends something similar.
55
See Craswell, supra note 13, at 494-95, 499 (arguing that expectation damages
result in incentives for excessive reliance upon the promise and that reliance damages
54
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As a general matter, Goetz and Scott argue, that problem calls for cau56
tion in adopting legal rules that enforce nonreciprocal promises. In
their view, that problem is especially salient in the context of preconsensual negotiation, where the decision of the parties not to be bound
formally is most likely to reflect a conscious opting-out of the consen57
sual remedial regime.
Ben-Shahar’s formal model seems to recognize the problem with a
58
regime of strict preconsensual liability. However, why is the regime
discussed here not subject to the same problem of excessive reliance?
His discussion of this regime does not seem to address the problem
59
directly. It is, of course, difficult to gauge the extent of that moral
hazard in the real world, and I am aware of no empirical evidence
about the frequency or severity of that problem. However, this objection raises a credible and plausible concern that may represent another cost of a no-retraction regime, which must be offset by the benefits the regime offers in enhancing the credibility of nonreciprocal
promises made in negotiations.

are even worse in this respect); Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1285 (noting that reliance damages create “a moral hazard because the promisee will not exercise optimal
self-protection”). Obviously, in some cases it might not be optimal to adopt a remedy
that obligated a breaching promisor to pay damages that exceed the optimal amount
of reliance. As Craswell notes and as I have explained elsewhere, however, those kinds
of supracompensatory promises might be highly rational in certain circumstances. See
Craswell, supra note 13, at 499-500 (listing economic factors that might justify such
damages); Mann, supra note 29, at 2235 (discussing the benefits of “the punitive bond
approach,” which would provide a bonding mechanism for “far beyond the amount of
the funds involved in the transaction”); see also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 20, at 617
(arguing that penalty clauses in contracts can “permit parties to induce efficient relation-specific investments”). It is not clear, however, and certainly not suggested by BenShahar, that courts should impose supracompensatory remedies as a default rule contrary to the intention of the parties.
56
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1281 (noting that, under certain conditions, “[n]onenforcement of . . . nonreciprocal promises is . . . the optimal choice”).
Craswell argues that courts can solve the moral hazard problem by enforcing the
promise only in cases in which the promisee’s reliance was efficient. Craswell, supra
note 13, at 494-95. To the extent courts can make that determination under the existing regime, Ben-Shahar’s decision to depart from that regime would reinstate a moral
hazard problem that the existing doctrine already may address adequately.
57
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1294 (asserting that “promises made during
preliminary bargaining are not enforceable until the bargain is sealed by an agreed
exchange”).
58
See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 434 (proposing a strict precontractual liability rule that prompts “each party [to] choose[] a level of reliance investment
that is excessive, given the other party’s investment”).
59
See id. at 445-47 (describing several scenarios in which parties will generate “optimal reliance” but neglecting to address the potential for “excessive reliance”).
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3. Credible Promises Before Consent
The final issue in assessing the promise of this new framework in
the period before a consensual agreement is to gauge by how much
the legal enforcement of nonreciprocal promises is likely to improve
upon existing mechanisms for making preconsensual promises credible. As with the foregoing discussion, I make no pretense of providing true empirical analysis. My goal, rather, is to examine what can be
gleaned from the existing literature and observations of commercial
practice as a mechanism for judging how well or how poorly the system works without this framework. If the system works relatively well
as it stands, then little can be gained by adopting this new regime to
enhance the credibility of preconsensual promises.
My impression is that the system works quite well in allowing parties to create relatively nuanced offers of credibility if they wish to do
so. I start with the main piece of empirical evidence on this point:
the results of a survey of corporate general counsels by my colleague
60
Russell Weintraub. Among other things, that survey investigated the
61
use of firm offers. The results strongly suggest that firm offers are
widely prevalent in the business world, particularly among larger
firms. Overall, about 76% of respondents received them, and about
62
73% said that they made them. On the question of whether the offers are reliable, the responses were almost unanimous: 95.2% rely on
63
them, and 96.8% expect offerees to rely on them. Lest this unanimity seem an odd artifact of small businesses and therefore not important to “real” commerce, Weintraub reports that the prevalence of
firm offers was directly proportional to the size of the respondent:
83.6% of billion-dollar companies received them, 75% of companies
in the $500 million to $1 billion range received them, and 57.1% of
64
companies in the $100 million to $500 million range received them.
65
As the discussion in a preceding subsection implies, firm offers
work only in a relatively simple type of transaction, in which the

60

See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1, 13-45 (presenting the results from a survey that Weintraub sent to the general counsels of 182 American corporations).
61
For a definition of a “firm offer,” see U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003).
62
Weintraub, supra note 60, at 27.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 27-28.
65
See supra Part I.A.1 (analyzing the information-related problems inherent in a
no-retraction regime and determining that the regime would prove more appropriate
for rather simplistic transactions).
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offeror needs no factual investigation to determine its willingness to
transact and the price at which it would transact. In those transactions, the simple and commonly used device of the firm offer should
be adequate to provoke reliance. Most negotiations, however, involve
interactions that are more complex. In those situations, parties commonly use obvious transactional devices such as earnest money or de66
posits to foster preconsensual investigation. For example, in many
contexts (most obviously the sale of commercial real estate), a prospective purchaser at an early stage of the transaction deposits a substantial sum of money (often several percent of the purchase price)
with a third party. The parties will sign a contract that provides for a
period during which the seller will collect and provide information
about the property to the prospective purchaser. At the end of this
period, the purchaser either will proceed to purchase the property or
67
will decide to walk away.
Those contracts involve a considerable investment by the seller,
both because of the cost of collecting and providing information and
because of the opportunity cost of committing for some specified time
68
to sell the property only to a particular purchaser. Most important
for present purposes, the contracts will include detailed provisions regarding the ultimate disposition of the deposit. Generally, the contracts will list conditions justifying the purchaser’s decision to terminate the arrangement with a return of the deposit or, alternatively,
justifying the seller’s retention of the deposit if the purchaser fails to
proceed.
Another obvious example, which involves probably the greatest
amount of preconsensual investment, is the inclusion of lockup and
breakup fees in merger and acquisition agreements. Those fees are
69
frequently quite large. A substantial academic literature addresses
the possible positive and negative incentives such fees might have
on the affected transactions.70 Nevertheless, there seems to be little

66

See, e.g., McBrien v. Master Dev., Inc., 840 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (involving the use of a signed letter of intent, which included a deposit provision, for the
investigation of property during negotiations); Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 249-51 (describing the use of earnest money in precontractual negotiations).
67
See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 249-53 (discussing such preliminary agreements
generally).
68
See id. at 225-29 (emphasizing the lost-opportunity element of reliance damages).
69
See, e.g., Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 47-50 (Del. 1997) (awarding a
$550 million fee to the plaintiff for the termination of a merger agreement).
70
For a sampling of this literature, see Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682 (1990);
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doubt that, as between the contracting parties themselves, those fees
represent a potential strategy to minimize transaction costs when opportunity costs and other preconsensual investments are a major focus
of the preconsensual stage of the transaction.
71
A final example appears in the large lending transaction. Those
transactions typically involve a large deposit or application fee by the
borrower at the time that the parties commence a serious collection of
information about the proposed investment. Again, those transactions involve considerable preconsensual investments by the parties;
the lender incurs the interest-rate risk inherent in committing to loan
funds at a specified rate at a specified date in the future, while the
borrower undertakes to collect information for the lender to assess in
connection with finalizing the details of the proposed transaction.
Similarly, a brief contract related to the deposit or to the fee will provide that the fee is—or is not—refundable if the transaction fails for
specified reasons. As in the previous examples, the transaction costs
of those devices for institutional actors should be quite low. Experience will give both borrowers and lenders a good understanding of an
appropriate deposit amount, given the complexity of the investigation
to be undertaken and the types of circumstances in which it might
make sense for the fee to be kept or returned.
At the other end of contracting practices, parties sometimes have
good reasons for erecting intentionally indefinite agreements. As Bob
72
Scott explains in his recent study of such cases, these arrangements
may do a much better job than more definite agreements of polic73
ing problems of shirking in performance. Moreover, because these
intentionally indefinite arrangements appear to be intertwined with
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate
Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1990); Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward
Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739 (1994); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control , 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539 (1996); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
A Reliance Damages Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 564 (1996).
71
In addition to the contextual situations discussed in the text, the common possibility remains that highly liquid parties would reach the same outcome through use
of a standard liquidated damages provision.
72
Scott, supra note 30, at 1675-85. Obviously, ambiguity exists as to whether intentionally incomplete contracts should be deemed preconsensual or postconsensual
transactions. I treat them here as preconsensual because that seems to me most plausible. However, the problem is closely related to the problem of interpreting intentionally indefinite agreements, which I discuss next in the context of postconsensual
transactions, infra Part I.B.
73
See Scott, supra note 30, at 1692 (concluding that intentionally incomplete agreements, by creating norms of “self-enforcement,” may be “more efficient than legal enforcement”).
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nonlegal sanctions, a broad doctrine providing for more enforcement
74
would diminish their effectiveness.
B. After Consent
The no-retraction model applies most significantly to the period
75
before consent.
Ben-Shahar’s presentation, however, extends his
aconsensual regime into the postconsensual period as well. My basic
concern here is that the application of his partial enforcement regime
in the postconsensual period often deprives parties of the benefits of a
reciprocal bargain in cases in which they have made one.
The basic premise of the unified model is that an important part
of the resolution of postconsensual disputes can occur through interpreting disputed contract provisions by reference to the positions that
parties took during the preconsensual period. As a general matter,
this premise seems to dispense with the concept of contractual interpretation as a device for ascertaining the parties’ likely intent with re76
spect to a disputed question. Contractual interpretation doctrines
rest fundamentally on the concept of consent: the party has taken
steps that objectively can be treated as consent to a contract and
should be bound by the objective meaning of the contract. It will defeat much of the point of drafting a contract if courts are no longer to
find the best understanding of the contract to which both parties have
consented and, instead, permit parties to enforce the contract only to
the limits of their contracting partner’s demonstrable understandings
77
of ambiguous provisions. Given the ease of locating ambiguity in
contractual provisions, this concept could be quite debilitating if afforded broad application. After a careful reading, however, it seems

74

The expression of this caution does not simultaneously imply that such arrangements should never result in judicial enforcement. As I discuss below, infra text
accompanying notes 98-121, I think the existing, more nuanced scheme for judicial
enforcement is likely to be less damaging than Ben-Shahar’s scheme, which discounts
the features important in current doctrine: the existence of consent and the justifiability of the reliance.
75
See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 443-52 (outlining and describing
the implications of the no-retraction rule in precontractual situations).
76
It also assumes that courts are not readily capable of recognizing and responding to opportunism directly, an assumption that is certainly contestable. See, e.g., T.W.
Oil, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 443 N.E.2d 932, 938-39 (N.Y. 1982) (refusing to
accept the buyer’s opportunistic rejection of a technically nonconforming tender by
the seller).
77
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 20, at 583 (arguing that “the best interpretive
default for firms is textualist when the issue is what their contract language meant”).
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clear that Ben-Shahar in fact does not contemplate the broad application of his proposal in a postconsensual setting. Rather, he applies it
in only a few localized settings, which I will now consider in turn.
1. Indefiniteness
Ben-Shahar’s most important application relates to indefinite con78
tracts. In that context, he argues that courts should not fill gaps
with majoritarian terms (his description of the dominant approach in
the Uniform Commercial Code and in the common law), but rather,
79
should fill gaps with pro-defendant terms. For the reasons discussed
at the beginning of this Section, it is quite doubtful that his approach
would improve upon existing practice. At least in the absence of any
information-forcing effects, the majoritarian outcome best serves both
80
parties. Moreover, the long-term effects of Ben-Shahar’s rule could
be most deleterious. For example, it would give parties a bad incentive in litigation: If the rule of law is that you will only be held to the
position you concede to be correct, you have a powerful incentive to
take an extreme position. The rule, then, might result in a practice of
increasingly extreme positions, with judges choosing between extreme
positions that are far less satisfactory than anything the plaintiff plau81
sibly could have expected when it entered the agreement.
2. Misunderstanding
The doctrine of misunderstanding applies when both parties as82
sign materially different meanings to the same term of the contract.
The classic case is the well-known Peerless situation, in which a contract
for materials on the ship Peerless was understood by the buyer and the

78

See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1845-47, 1864-65 (explaining gap-filling with
regard to incomplete agreements).
79
Ben-Shahar provides a more expansive articulation of that point in Omri BenShahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. (forthcoming). I limit myself here to a response to the brief points he makes in
the essay at hand.
80
Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 20, at 584-90 (arguing for a plain-meaning, “majority talk” default in cases where a contract is silent on a matter).
81
Furthermore, as I discuss elsewhere, supra note 74 and accompanying text; infra
note 99 and accompanying text, there is good reason to think in many cases that judicial enforcement of indefinite agreements under Ben-Shahar’s regime might undermine the efforts of parties with such agreements to opt out of legal enforcement entirely.
82
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 20(1), 201 (1981).
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83

seller to refer to different ships of the same name. In the absence of
fault on either side, the existing doctrine treats such a situation as a
84
failure of mutual assent, and thus a failure of the contract. BenShahar takes the view, building on his view of negotiations, that it
would be better to allow either party to enforce the contract to the
limits of the other party’s understanding, rather than to treat the con85
tract as a failure in its entirety. In fact, much can be said for the view
86
that it is wrong to let the contract be treated as entirely lapsed. BenShahar’s proposal thus suggests a sensible possibility for providing
some response to the question of where the losses might have fallen
87
without an enforceable agreement.
The basic problem with gauging the practical significance of that
proposal is the assumption that these contracts often fail because
neither party was at fault. It is more common, it seems, for both par88
ties to be at fault. Brian Simpson’s comprehensive treatment of the
Peerless case, for example, leaves the impression that the common use
of the ship name Peerless at the time reasonably should have led both
parties to inquire further about the particular ship involved in the

83

Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864). For a thorough discussion
of the case, see A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 135-62
(1996).
84
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 20(1), 201 (1981).
85
Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1856.
86
In the misunderstanding context, the view is not entirely novel. See Cady v.
Gale, 5 W. Va. 547, 565 (1871) (enforcing against the husband’s estate an agreement
to convey the wife’s land that was void against the wife, with an explanation that “[t]he
doctrine has been long and firmly settled by the authorities in England, that where a
vendor contracts to sell a larger interest in the real estate than he has title to,” a court
will compel him to convey such an estate or interest as he may have, if the vendee “is
willing to accept such title and interest”); 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 611, at 699 (1960) (stating that, when a defendant successfully claims
mutual mistake, a “court may say that the transaction was ‘void,’” and yet “if the defendant had been content with the agreement as made, in spite of the mistake, it is believed that he could have enforced it against the other party”); cf. 1 B. S. MARKESINIS ET
AL., THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RESTITUTION: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 20506 (1997) (discussing “the right to ‘save’ the contract by agreeing to those terms which
the mistaken party had in mind when initially agreeing to the contract”). I thank Alan
Rau for those references.
87
For a similar response, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1124 (1984) (“Since in such a case any out-of-pocket
loss incurred by either party results from the equal fault of both, there is no good reason why only one party should bear it. . . . [T]he rule should be that where each party
is equally at fault, out-of-pocket losses should be split evenly.” (footnote omitted)).
88
See id. at 1123-24 (arguing that, in cases like Peerless, “[t]he probability is high . . .
that both parties are at fault”).
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89

transaction. Indeed, surely on those facts, at least one party had
some reason to know of the potential for misunderstanding.
In truth, the doctrine of misunderstanding does not seem to apply
often outside of a first-year law student’s classroom. It is the rare case
in which a court finds that a misunderstanding between the parties
obviates the mutual assent necessary to form a contract. It is common
for a court that purports to apply Restatement sections 20 or 201 to
90
conclude that the parties were not equally at fault. Thus, I have the
sense that Ben-Shahar includes the misunderstanding doctrine not
because he believes that it raises one of the most important issues of
practical contract interpretation, but simply because it is an issue for
which his approach may prove useful.
3. Intentional Incompleteness
Ben-Shahar also applies his concept to situations in which the parties intentionally agree to incomplete or ambiguous contracts because
91
of a decision not to resolve the substance of a particular issue. BenShahar argues that the application of an all-or-nothing approach or a
standard gap-filling technique would violate the parties’ choice for
92
ambiguity. It is just as plausible, however, to think that the parties’
choice for ambiguity reflects a considered willingness to allow the

89

See SIMPSON, supra note 83, at 140-41 (stating that at least eleven ships named
Peerless were in existence but that the individual ships were easily identified at the time
by use of their captains’ names); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law,
91 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1613 (2003) (“Given a common practice of using the same name
for more than one ship, both parties . . . were at fault . . . .”).
90
For examples of this phenomenon, see NL Industries v. GHR Energy Corp., 940
F.2d 957, 969 (5th Cir. 1991); Downey v. Clauder, 811 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D. Ohio
1992); Schaer v. Webster County, 644 N.W.2d 327, 338 (Iowa 2002); Moody v. McLellan,
367 S.E.2d 449, 451 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988); Exxon Corp. v. Bell, 695 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985).
91
Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1857-60, 1864-65. In my experience, the application of this doctrine is also a rare occurrence. Ambiguities arise much more frequently
where the parties either fail to anticipate and include contractual language to address
a particular issue that later arises or fail to think through the consequences of contractual language that is used in light of an issue that later arises. In some circumstances,
of course, one of the parties is aware of an ambiguity in the contract language, but that
party does not seek to clarify the language out of a desire to reduce further negotiation
costs. Only where the parties actually discussed an issue and then intentionally inserted an ambiguity into the contract would there be alternative, enforceable positions.
I never experienced such a situation during my years of negotiating contracts.
92
See id. at 1858 (“[E]nforcing their precontractual understanding as if it were a
contract . . . would deprive the parties of the power they sought to maintain—to reject
unfavorable additional terms.”).
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issue to be resolved later in the discretion of a third-party decision
maker. Thus, the parties might rationally believe that the expenditure
of further resources to reach agreement on an issue that is unlikely to
arise would be best served by an ambiguous contract, with each party
holding the expectation that a court later would view that party’s posi93
tion as more reasonable. My intuition is that contracting parties are
94
more likely to think that the latter risk is the one they are taking.
I have not identified a specific adverse economic effect of this part
of the no-retraction proposal. On the other hand, I do not understand the formal model to go so far as to provide support for the proposal either. Thus, I think Ben-Shahar is only suggesting as a doctrinal matter that this principle might present an attractive default
rule. I find that suggestion intriguing, but am inclined to think that
there is considerable plausibility in the traditional rule and that the
traditional rule is more likely to implement the expectations of the
parties. Of course, that might be because lawyers expect application
of the traditional rule, so implementation of the no-retraction rule
could conflict with their expectations. I do not think, however, that
Ben-Shahar has gone far enough here to make a case that his rule
95
provides sufficiently superior outcomes to justify the change.
II. PROBLEMS WITH OPTING OUT
As with any issue involving the articulation of a rule for contracts,
it is important to consider the extent to which the rule should be a default rule, around which the parties readily can contract, or a mandatory rule, which would govern notwithstanding the intentions of the
parties. That issue is particularly important here because Ben-Shahar
93

See Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855,
2007 (1985) (“In fact, intentional ambiguity is sometimes desired . . . as when parties
to a contract would rather not face a potential issue, preferring instead to deal with the
issue ambiguously and leave the solution of the problem, should it arise, to determination by subsequent litigation.”).
94
Perhaps the strongest support for that intuition is the common practice of including in negotiated contracts a clause that explicitly excludes from the contract any
positions the parties might have expressed during precontractual negotiations. To get
a sense for the contracting context, see Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms
in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678, 2699-700 (2000) (discussing results of interviews that
address reasons why parties decide to enter contracts without resolving known disagreements about the terms of the relationship and indicating that such parties deem
“the costs of reviewing and then negotiating about nonimmediate terms . . . simply not
worth the benefit”).
95
Ben-Shahar, supra note 79, attempts a more extended defense of the rule suggested here. It is far beyond the scope of this critique to address that article, however.
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acknowledges the problem of promising costs that I discuss and sug97
gests that parties can avoid those costs by contracting out of the rule.
Thus, Ben-Shahar asserts, a no-retraction regime will impose no such
costs because parties can avoid this rule when it would be costly to
them. This part of my analysis considers three points: (1) the possibility that the need to contract out of the rule will lead to significant
overenforcement costs, (2) the likelihood that the existing rule has
substantial information-forcing benefits that Ben-Shahar’s rule would
discard, and (3) the likelihood that a regime granting an untrammeled right to opt out would lead to unacceptable levels of abusive
behavior.
The question remains, of course, whether any of this critique matters if the only point in question is a default rule. Ben-Shahar consciously offers his system as a default rule, out of which parties could
contract at will by the simple device of establishing in negotiations
that they do not wish to embrace his aconsensual regime. If I have
done nothing more than identify reasons that some businesses might
embrace for rejecting his regime in certain transactions, then I have
done little to show any harm from his rule: businesses worried about
opportunism will leave themselves in the no-retraction regime, and
businesses worried about risk will opt out to the more traditional system. Recent scholars, however, have come to recognize more generally that incorrect default rules necessarily impose substantial costs on
98
parties not only because of the costs related to opting out of them,
but also because of the possibility that courts may prove unwilling to
99
accept a decision to opt out of them. If these scholars are right, then
the analysis above, standing alone, would be enough to suggest problems with the adoption of the no-retraction default rule. In my view,
however, the problems with the proposed default rule are broader
than the global concerns with incorrect default rules.
96

Supra Part I.
Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1842; see also supra text accompanying note 22 (quoting Ben-Shahar’s principal conclusion in this regard).
98
Ian Ayres, in particular, discusses “‘the iron law of default inertia’” that is, in his
view, “an important determinant of human action.” Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract
Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 891 (2003) (quoting Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1598 (1999)).
99
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 20, at 608 n.144 (“[C]ourts tend to regard statecreated defaults as presumptively fair or efficient.”). As Ian Ayres intimates, whether
the right answer is that courts should make it as easy as possible to opt out of default
rules has yet to be determined. See Ayres, supra note 98, at 897-99 (pointing to “basic
unanswered questions about how the law should set opt-out rules”). My point here is
that courts in fact do resist opting out, which makes the default rules more “sticky.”
97
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A. Overenforcement
The first point is a simple one, drawn from the seminal discussion
100
of this problem by Goetz and Scott. As mentioned above, remedies
that allow parties to recover the entire amount that they expend in reliance on a promise create a moral hazard, a risk that the parties will
101
not limit their expenditures to reasonable amounts. Goetz and Scott
explain that the imposition of those remedies after a formal agreement is less problematic because the agreement provides a context in
which the parties can select an enforcement regime that deals with
102
such problems.
The other side, of course, is that the imposition of those remedies
before the parties have an opportunity to contract out of them poses a
serious danger of overenforcing those promises. To put it another
way, in the preconsensual context, the least reliance should be placed
on default rules because the parties are least likely to have had an op103
portunity to contract around the default rules in an informed way.
The point of course can be overstated. As noted above, parties
have entered preliminary agreements in which they could opt out of
104
Indeed, it seems clear that such
such a regime in many contexts.
105
However, the import of that practice is
agreements are common.
simply to narrow the field within which the no-retraction proposal will
have an effect. My concern is with the effects of the proposal within
the field where it will apply. In that field, it can have a substantial cost
precisely because parties have not had an opportunity to opt out of it.

100

Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1277-88.
See supra Part I.A.2 (describing “[t]he [p]roblem of [e]xcessive [r]eliance” as
one which involves a moral hazard created by a rule which allows parties to recover
their reliance costs); see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1285 (identifying the problem of a moral hazard).
102
Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1295-97.
103
Because the discussion here relates only tangentially to consumers, I doubt that
Russell Korobkin’s analysis of the status quo bias has a major impact. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 612 (1998)
(positing that “contracting parties view default terms as part of the status quo”).
104
Supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
105
See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 257-58 (describing such agreements in the mergers and acquisitions context); Johnston, supra note 39, at 403-04 (describing the use of
such agreements in the negotiations surrounding the sale of a business); Scott, supra
note 30, at 1677 (describing “indefinite bonus agreements” in which a “nonverifiable
bonus” is promised in return for “additional, nonverifiable performance”).
101
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B. Information-Forcing Defaults
The no-retraction regime also discards a useful feature of the existing regime: its ability to force the transfer of information as a
106
predicate to liability. In the existing system, absent some substantial
107
amount of unfair dealing (the subject of the next Section), a party
will not expect to recover the costs it expends at the preconsensual
stage unless a specific contractual provision deals with the problem.
This rule does not in fact prevent parties from recovering such expenditures any more than the analogous rule that limits recovery for
108
It does, however, prevent
unforeseeable consequential damages.
parties from recovering for those items after the fact if they do not re109
veal them to their negotiating partner before the fact.
Thus, for example, if parties believe that certain expenditures efficiently would provide information about particular risks of going
forward, they can agree that the funds will be spent and agree on an
allocation of responsibility for those expenditures if the transaction
does not go forward. That contractual freedom is, after all, what allows parties to agree upon breakup fees or to post a refundable or
nonrefundable deposit of earnest money or the like. This system
permits parties to allocate those expenditures in the way that seems
best to the parties at the time. Moreover, its information-forcing aspects can force a joint decision on the timing and nature of expenditures, which should increase the effectiveness of those expenditures by
limiting the duplication of effort. To return to the real estate pur110
chase example from above, a joint decision on the scope and timing
of an environmental audit doubtless is superior to a unilateral decision by the prospective buyer.
By removing the link between the disclosure that is inherent in
consent and the obligation to compensate, the no-retraction regime
106

See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95-100 (1989) (examining penalty default rules
as “a way to encourage the production of information”). For a discussion of information-forcing defaults in the retraction context, see Craswell, supra note 13, at 545-46.
107
Infra Part II.C.
108
For an argument that the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151
(Ex. D. 1854), does a poor job of forcing the production of that information, see Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1771-79; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563, 587-98 (1992).
109
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 20, at 598 n.116 (describing “informationforcing” default rules that “create an incentive for a party to disclose relevant information to its contract partner”).
110
Supra p. 1883.
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systematically alters the incentives of parties to make those decisions
jointly. Because joint decisions about the collection and analysis of
information generally will be superior to separate decisions, the benefit of the no-retraction regime seems questionable.
C. Untrammeled Freedom from Contract
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the proposal is its apparent
willingness to afford people an unqualified ability to opt out of any
regime for preconsensual liability.111 The basic premise of the law in
this area—indeed, of the entire Uniform Commercial Code—is that
parties cannot control their exposure entirely. In areas policed by a
112
duty of good faith, the parties always must recognize the potential
for liability no matter what their contracts say. It may be that untethered good faith obligations fit uncomfortably with the general
predilection that commercial law has for rules that are certain and
113
predictable. Nonetheless, the idea of good faith as an ineradicable
backstop for behavior that is not commercially acceptable is one that
proves deeply woven into our culture. However uncertain it might
seem, it is too late in the day to argue seriously that it is harmful for
114
businesses to be subject to that sort of review.
Thus, I am puzzled by Ben-Shahar’s willingness to leave this area
115
entirely to the will of the parties. I understand why parties may not
want to be bound directly by the positions that they offer in negotiations. As discussed above, there are strong reasons why concerns
111

Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1842.
The duty of good faith applies not only in areas where courts adopt it by common law, but also in all transactions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003).
113
Inherent in the concept of “good faith,” of course, is the notion that it not be
reducible to a simple definition. See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196
(1968) (stating that “good faith” is “a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its own”).
114
See James J. White, Good Faith and the Cooperative Antagonist, 54 SMU L. REV.
679, 679 (2001) (acknowledging that “no court, nor any academic writer, has ever
been so bold or so gauche as to suggest that good faith should not attend the obligations of parties under the UCC”).
115
Perhaps I overread Ben-Shahar’s views here. At one point, he does recognize
the importance of the duty of good faith. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1846 (“[T]he
good faith duty is now an integral part of most legal systems . . . .”). At another point,
he discusses a truncated version of a duty of good faith in negotiations. See id. at 186061 (exploring the duty of good faith as it would pertain to no-retraction liability). It is
still not clear, however, that the duty would apply to parties that opted out under his
regime.
112
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about opportunism might not persuade a sophisticated and informed
business to adopt a regime in which it would be bound by those posi116
The acknowledgment of these reasons, however, does not
tions.
then mean that there should be no recourse whatsoever for misbehavior in the process of negotiation. The reporters are replete with cases
117
in which parties have challenged misdeeds in that process. Some of
them report behavior that plainly should be sanctionable. Whether
118
those cases are characterized as involving unfair dealing, the viola119
tion of a duty of good faith, or simply circumstances in which nonreciprocal offers have been made in ways that justifiably induced reli120
ance, the central point remains that the law has done well in imposing a backstop that cannot be removed by contract. Because the parties likely to engage in that behavior are also the parties most likely to
121
insist on opting out of any optional legal regime, it seems illogical to
consign this issue entirely to the parties.
CONCLUSION
As always, Ben-Shahar provides a careful economic analysis and a
welcome willingness to embrace the implications of real-world qualifications. My remarks today are intended in that spirit. I hope they illustrate both the contribution he has made and the boundaries that
cabin it. This proposal is interesting and is likely to spark a considerable academic debate. My main point is that serious consideration of
the proposal as a policy recommendation should be preceded by a

116

See supra text accompanying notes 24-28, 43-52 (contrasting the no-retraction
regime with current commercial practices and providing examples of legitimate reasons for opposing the regime).
117
I do not share Ben-Shahar’s pessimism about the state of the law in this area.
This area of law began to develop in only the last few decades, so the fact that it remains in flux should not be at all surprising. Moreover, this state of continuing change
should seem even less surprising given the deep academic doubts about the reasons for
which liability should be appropriate.
118
See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 280-85 (recommending the imposition of a duty
of fair dealing).
119
See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1796-813 (discussing the evolution of a “duty to
negotiate in good faith”); Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1319-20 (discussing the liability for bad faith in preliminary negotiations).
120
See Craswell, supra note 13, at 538 (arguing that the cases compensate reliance
“especially where the other party appears to have wanted the first party to rely”).
121
See, e.g., Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 293-96 (3d Cir. 1986)
(exhibiting the willingness of a party, who later broke a promise to negotiate in good
faith, to enter into written agreements about these precontractual negotiations); see
also Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1799-802 (commenting on the Channel Home case).
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good deal of industry-specific and transaction-specific research of the
important underlying factual questions discussed in this Commentary.
The most important inquiry would be to gain some empirical understanding of the reasons that parties commonly retreat from bargaining
positions. Of secondary importance, though still of considerable
value in assessing his proposal, would be knowledge in various contexts of the actual practices of parties in making their negotiating
offers binding or nonbinding. Although Ben-Shahar’s proposal arguably is simply a change of a default rule, an understanding of commercial views as to the “right” answer would be important to a fair assessment of the likelihood that the change would be positive.
Related to that point, it is easy to ask why it would be important to
change a default rule around which sophisticated parties can contract.
I hope I have suggested some credible reasons why the existing body
of contract law is more than that bare description would imply. In its
fullest sense, the existing law is a system of contextual rules, evolved
over many years to deal with issues specific to particular transactions
and industries. It would be imprudent to discard the role of consent
in that system without further thought.

